Homeowners sued Peterson's Oil Service, alleging that Peterson sold them fuel for home heating which contained more that 5% biodiesel.

Insurers' Motion to Determine Lack of Occurrence Fails

The federal district court, interpreting Massachusetts law, found there were genuine issues of fact as to whether the insured's mixing of biodiesel with home heating fuel was an occurrence. United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Peterson's Oil Serv., Inc., 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106980 (D. Mass. June 17, 2024).

Homeowners sued Peterson's Oil Service, alleging that Peterson sold them fuel for home heating which contained more that 5% biodiesel. The homeowners further alleged that fuel containing more than 5% biodiesel did not meet industry standards and caued damage to their home heating equipment. Peterson allegedly did not fully disclose the presence of biodiesel in their fuel, despite knowing the risk posed by high-biodiesel blended fuel.

The insurers, United States Fire Insurance Company and The North River Insurance Company, defended Peterson under a reservation of rights. United States Fire issued priomary policies with limits of $1,000,000 per occurrence and $2,000,000 as a general aggregate limit. An endorsement titled "Limited Coverage - Failure to Supply" limited the amount covered for "property damage arising out of the failure of any insured to adequately supply gas, oil, water, electricty or steam" to $250,000. North River issued umbrella policies with additional coverage in the amount of $15,000,000 per occurrnce and in the aggregate if property damage was caused by an occurrence. The umbrella policies also contained a "Failure to Supply Exclusion" which excluded coverage for "property damage arising out of the failure of an insured to adequately supply gas, oil, water, electricty or steam."

Mr. Eyerly may be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com

Plaintiffs prevailed on the theory that a Louisiana public entity had “damaged and interfered with their use and enjoyment of their private homes and church” during a New Orleans drainage project.

Litigation Roundup: “You Can’t Make Me Pay!”

The foregoing is an accurate statement, generally speaking, for Louisiana public entities. Statutory and constitutional provisions in Louisiana protect public entities from being forced to pay monies – including satisfying court judgments – when the monies have not been specifically allocated for the purpose. Correspondingly, there is ordinarily no means to seize public assets to satisfy judgments.

On the other hand, writs of mandamus in Louisiana – actions designed to compel a public official to undertake a ministerial duty over which the public official has no discretion – can be aimed at forcing a public official (on behalf of the public entity) to pay money.

In an inverse condemnation case, plaintiffs prevailed on the theory that a Louisiana public entity had “damaged and interfered with their use and enjoyment of their private homes and church” during a New Orleans drainage project. The plaintiffs pursued a writ of mandamus to compel payment their approximately $1.5 million judgment for damages and fees as a “ministerial duty” of the public entity. To be sure, in connection with the judgment, the public entity had not at any time specifically allocated funds for the payment.

Mr. Lund may be contacted at daniel.lund@phelps.com

CSI Electrical Contractors was hired to provide procurement, installation, construction and testing services at a large 280 megawatt privately-owned solar power facility.

Employees in Construction Industry Entitled to Compensation for Time Spent Complying with Employer-Mandated Security Protocols

Wage and hour laws dictating how employers must compensate their employees for time worked can, given the innumerable ways that employees perform their jobs, raise a number of questions. The next case, Huerta v. CSI Electrical Contractors, 15 Cal.5th 908 (2024) – which I won’t spend a lot of time discussing since I think it applies in somewhat limited situations – addresses whether employees are entitled to be paid while waiting to enter and exit worksites and for meal periods when they are not allowed to exit a worksite.

The Huerta Case
The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals requested that the California Supreme Court address three questions related to whether employees should be compensated under California wage and hour laws for time spent waiting to enter and exit worksites and for meal periods when they are not allowed to exit a worksite:

1. Whether employees should be paid for time spent waiting in a personal vehicle to be scanned in and out of a worksite;
2. Whether employees should be paid for time spent traveling in a personal vehicle from a security gate to employee parking lots; and
3. Whether employees should be paid during meal periods if they are not permitted to leave a worksite.

Mr. Murai may be contacted at gmurai@nomosllp.com